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Abstract
We consider private commons for secondary sharing of licensed spectrum bands with no access
coordination provided by the primary license holder. In such environments, heterogeneity in demand
patterns of the secondary users can lead to constant changes in the interference levels, and thus can
be a source of volatility to the utilities of the users. In this paper, we consider secondary users to be
service providers that provide downlink services. We formulate the spectrum sharing problem as a non-
cooperative iterated game of power control where service providers change their power levels to fix their
long-term average rates at utility-maximizing values. First, we show that in any iterated 2 × 2 game,
the structure of the single-stage game dictates the degree of control that a service provider can exert on
the long-term outcome of the game. Then we show that if service providers use binary actions either
to access or not to access the channel at any round of the game, then the long-term rate can be fixed
regardless of the strategy of the opponent. We identify these rates and show that they can be achieved
using mixed Markovian strategies that will be clearly identified in the paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in mobile broadband access technologies in the recent years have resulted in an ex-
ponential surge in demand for wireless data services [10]. While the demand is expected to grow, the
wireless industry is trying to develop techniques to improve utilization of available radio spectrum bands.
This has led to the advent of cognitive radio technologies which allow network users to adapt their system
parameters to the dynamic environment and optimize spectrum utilization without necessarily cooperating
to pursue such goals. Under this paradigm where centralization and traditional spectrum sharing techniques
2are no longer valid concepts in modern spectrum utilization, game theory has emerged as a useful tool
for modeling and analyzing user behavior in non-cooperative spectrum sharing environments. See [2] for
a recent survey on games for cognitive radio networks.
Non-cooperative spectrum sharing can be studied for scenarios that involve secondary provision of
licensed spectrum where primary license holders lease out the surplus of their spectral capacities to some
secondary users. These scenarios for spectrum sharing have been made possible by recent regulatory
models that emerged under different proposals including the FCC’s private commons model [13] and
the licensed shared access model of the EU [26]. Suggested models entail that spectrum provision
may not necessarily require license holders to coordinate spectrum access among secondary users. For
example, under the private commons model, secondary users are granted spectrum access via using peer-
to-peer communications without relying on the license holder’s infrastructure. In fact, license holders
may not even need to have a deployed network in order to be eligible for this model [8]. However,
license holders can still authorize the use of certain communication devices or can dictate using specific
technical parameters.
This paper presents a framework for designing strategies for secondary sharing of licensed spectrum
bands. The underlying communication system involves a number of service providers that share an
interference channel to provide downlink services without access coordination. A distinctive feature of
sharing licensed channels, versus sharing unlicensed ones, is that the utilities of the service providers
from achieving some rate on the channel are discounted by the cost of utilizing the channel. This cost
is paid to the primary license holder on usage basis in the form of monetary compensation. Since it
is plausible to assume that the marginal utility of each service provider decreases by increasing the
rate, transmitting at the maximum allowed power level can be sub-optimal from a utility maximization
point of view. In this respect, operating at a utility-maximizing rate from the standpoint of any of the
service providers is governed by the interference in the channel which depends on the demand patterns
of the service providers. Specifically, at times when the demand is high, a service provider transmits at
relatively higher power levels causing more interference, and visa versa when the demand is low, thus
leading to variations in the interference. Demand patterns are generally unknown, and the key problem
is to design strategies for power control that help service providers achieve their optimal rates and cope
with fluctuations in the interference.
In this paper, secondary sharing of licensed spectrum is formulated as an iterative game of power
control. Namely, at each round of the game service providers choose their transmission power levels
and consequently achieve some downlink rates that depend also on the interference from other service
3providers. We show that, there exist strategies that allow service providers to fix their rates, on the long
term, regardless of the strategies of their opponents. The key idea is to realize that in iterated games
with same action space and same payoff profiles, players with longer memories have no advantage over
players with shorter ones. Therefore, players can in any round condition their moves on the outcome
of the game in the previous round. This implies that iterated games can lend themselves to Markovian
analysis where a player’s strategy can be defined in terms of the state transition probabilities of the
resulted Markovian chain.
We use this insight in the power control game. First, we show that in any 2 × 2 iterated game,1 the
structure of the payoff matrix of any of the players in the single-stage game dictates whether or not a
player can control its long-term payoff of the game. We also show that this property can be realized in the
power control game by transforming the action space of the service providers into a binary space; either
to access or not to access the channel in each round of the game. The approach provides the players
with full control on a range of rates that will be clearly characterized in the paper. In essence, a player
can achieve any value in the valid range by iterating its actions using mixed (probabilistic) Markovian
strategies. The intuition behind this approach is to allow players to maintain a certain rate, on the long
term, by using reactive strategies such that whenever the average rate exceeds the targeted value, it can
be lowered by not participating in the channel in some future rounds. The paper identifies these strategies
and shows that any fixed outcome of the game can be achieved using multiple strategies that differ by
their convergence rates.
Game theory for sharing wireless resources is a widely studied topic in communication networks, in
particular, using the classical theory of non-cooperative games [24]. Proposed strategic-game models for
sharing interference channels have included pricing mechanisms [5], [15], [23], [27], medium access
control [17], [18], and transmission power control of both the uplink (end-users to base-stations) and
the downlink (base-stations to end-users) [3], [4], [11]. A common assumptions in these models is that
game structure and rationality of players are common knowledge in the game, i.e., players hold beliefs
about each others’ strategic choices [6]. Such assumptions are not limited to single-stage games but also
extend to iterated games where players interact in multiple rounds.
Iterated games are studied to induce cooperation in self organizing wireless ad-hoc networks. Most of
the studies use the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma game to model packet forwarding between nodes [14],
[16], [19]. The model is motivated by many experimental studies which show that Tit-For-Tat can be an
1Two players each with boolean action space leading to a 2× 2 payoff matrix.
4efficient strategy in this regard [7]. An important feature of iterated games is the fact that an action taken
by a player at any round of the game has an impact on the future actions of the other players. This in
turn leads to the concept of punishment for deviating from equilibrium strategies. Such techniques are
applied in the area of sharing unlicensed bands, particularly in [12], where multiple systems coexist and
interfere with each other. In essence, in [12], spectrum sharing is modeled as an iterated power control
game to devise self-enforcing power control rules that lead to fair and efficient Nash equilibria.
In this work, we follow a different approach from [12] and seek power control strategies that allow
service providers to share spectrum on the downlinks and maintain average rates that are robust to
variations in power control strategies of the opponents. Our work is motivated by recent results in the
theory of iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma games, where Press and Dyson have recently shown in [25] that
these games admit zero-determinant strategies, which in some cases allow players to control each others’
long-term payoffs, and in other cases allow them to set a linear relationship between the payoffs. Such
strategies are realized if we observe that progression of the game can be formulated as a one-step Markov
process. The approach of [25], from which the earlier results of [9] can be obtained as a special case,
more readily admits generalization to asymmetric games, with different payoff structures that can involve
more than two players.
The major contribution of our paper can be summarized as follows:
1) We present an extension of the approach in [25] and clearly identify structures of 2× 2 games that
allow player to control its own payoff or that of the opponent, thus implying a broader application
that is not restricted to the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. We follow a generalized approach as we do
not assume symmetric payoffs of the players, and thus no assumption of symmetric control on the
outcome of the game.
2) We identify the feasible set of payoffs that a player can guarantee from the game and identify
mixed Markovian strategies (zero-determinant strategies) for each possible outcome of the game.
Furthermore, we show that the notion of payoff control is not restricted to two-player games, but
can be extended to games with multiple players.
3) We formulate secondary sharing of wireless spectrum as an iterated game of power control. We
use an economic model for downlink data transmission to argue that, in interference channels with
no access coordination, players can fix their long-term rates at utility-maximizing values by taking
binary actions (e.g., either to transmit at maximum power or not to transmit). In this regard, we
identify strategies for iterating these actions and study their convergence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we address zero-determinant strategies
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Fig. 1. One round payoff matrix of the iterated two-player two-action game.
for 2× 2 iterated games and present our results for games of general payoff structures. We also extend
our results to include games with more than two players. In Section III, we analyze secondary spectrum
sharing as an iterated game of power control and devise strategies for the proposed 2×2 game. A numerical
study to analyze convergence and power consumption of these strategies is provided in Section IV. Finally,
the paper concludes in Section V.
II. ZERO-DETERMINANT STRATEGIES FOR ITERATED GAMES
In this section, we develop new results on iterated games where the action space and the payoff matrix
do not change over the course of the game. Our analysis is based on the approach of [25] which shows
that there exist strategies for indefinitely iterated 2× 2 games that are referred to as “zero-determinant”
strategies and which allow the players to control their long-term payoffs or the payoffs of their opponents.
The type of control that a player can exert hinges on the structure of the game. In this section, we identify
these structures and any feasible set of payoffs that can be controlled. We also identify the strategies that
lead to this control.
For this purpose, consider a 2×2 iterated game with the single round payoff matrix given in Figure 1.
In each round of the game, row player X and column player Y have binary actions, respectively n1, n2 ∈
{1, 2}, leading to payoffs, respectively Xn, Yn where n = (n1, n2). A salient feature of iterated games is
that players with longer memories of the history of the game have no advantage over those with shorter
ones, i.e., a strategy of a player that shares the same history used by the opponent does not gain more
from using longer history of the game. This is due to the iterative nature of the game where actions
and payoffs are indefinitely fixed (see the Appendix of [25]), and thus, strategies can be designed by
assuming that the players have memories of a single move.
6A. Zero Determinant Strategies for 2× 2 Games
We describe the state of the game in any round by the actions of the players in that round. Specifically,
let Ω denote the set of all possible states,2 i.e.,
Ω = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)}, (1)
and let n(t) denote the state of the game in round t ≥ 0. In each round, players choose their actions
with probabilities that depend on the state of the game in the previous round and thus the process
{n(t) : t = 0, 1, · · · } can be modeled as a Markov chain.
In this respect, consider player X and let
pk1 = Pr (n1(t+ 1) = 1 | n(t) = k) , ∀k ∈ Ω,
denote the probability that player X takes action 1 in round t + 1 if in the previous round, player X
took action k1 and player Y took action k2. For player Y , similarly let
pk2 = Pr(n2(t+ 1) = 1 | n(t) = k), ∀k ∈ Ω.
To simplify notation, we write
pk = pk1 and qk = pk2 .
The set of actions of a player is referred to as the strategy of that player, i.e., {pk,∀k ∈ Ω} is a strategy
of player X and {qk,∀k ∈ Ω} is a strategy of player Y . The state transition matrix of the Markov chain
can be described as follows assuming that the rows and the columns are in the same order as listed in (1):
M =


p1,1q1,1 p1,1(1− q1,1) (1− p1,1)q1,1 (1− p1,1)(1 − q1,1)
p1,2q2,1 p1,2(1− q2,1) (1− p1,2)q2,1 (1− p1,2)(1 − q2,1)
p2,1q1,2 p2,1(1− q1,2) (1− p2,1)q1,2 (1− p2,1)(1 − q1,2)
p2,2q2,2 p2,2(1− q2,2) (1− p2,2)q2,2 (1− p2,2)(1 − q2,2)


.
Let pii,j be the probability that player X takes action i and player Y takes action j. The Markov chain
has a stationary distribution piT = (pi1,1, pi1,2, pi2,1, pi2,2) that satisfies
pi
TM = piT.
2In the application to spectrum sharing which will be addressed later in the paper, play action 1 will correspond to accessing
the channel with maximum power, while play action 2 will correspond to accessing the channel with lower power or not
accessing the channel at all.
7pi is unique if and only if the chain has a unique closed communication class. In this case, the long-term
payoff for player X is given by
uX = pi
TX (2)
and for player Y is given by
uY = pi
TY, (3)
where
X =


X1,1
X1,2
X2,1
X2,2


and Y =


Y1,1
Y1,2
Y2,1
Y2,2


.
Assuming unique stationary pi, we can write
pi
TM˜ = 0,
where M˜ = M− I. Let adj(M˜) be the adjugate matrix, i.e., the transposed matrix of signed minors. By
Cramer’s rule,
adj(M˜)M˜ = det(M˜)I = 0,
where the second equality holds because M˜ is singular. This implies that each row of the matrix adj(M˜)
is proportional to pi. Furthermore, for an arbitrary vector f , piTf is the determinant of a modified version
of M˜ with a column replaced by f . The determinant does not change by adding the first column of this
modified matrix to the second and third columns, so that
pi
Tf = det


−1 + p1,1q1,1 −1 + p1,1 −1 + q1,1 f1
p1,2q2,1 −1 + p1,2 q2,1 f2
p2,1q1,2 p2,1 −1 + q1,2 f3
p2,2q2,2 p2,2 q2,2 f4


. (4)
A key observation of [25] is that the second and the third columns of the matrix in (4) are purely
dependent on the actions of player X and player Y , respectively. In specific,
m˜X =


−1 + p1,1
−1 + p1,2
p2,1
p2,2


and m˜Y =


−1 + q1,1
q2,1
−1 + q1,2
q2,2


.
8Without loss of generality, consider the game from the standpoint of player X. If m˜X = f , the determinant
in (4) is equal to 0, and thus if f = aX+ b, Equation (4) is
auX + b = 0, (5)
where uX is defined in (2), and a and b are non-zero real numbers.
Player X can thus fix the value of uX regardless of the strategy of player Y . To achieve this, the values
of a and b should be chosen such that p1,1, p1.2, p2,1, and p2,2 are probabilities which in turn depends on
the structure of the game via the equality m˜X = aX+ b.
In the following theorem, we state our first result that defines the structures of 2 × 2 games where
player X can control uX and defines the strategies that lead to such control.
Theorem 1. For k = 1, 2, let Xk,min and Xk,max, respectively, denote the minimum and maximum value
of row k in the payoff matrix of a 2× 2 iterated game. Specifically,
Xk,min = min(Xk,1,Xk,2),
Xk,max = max(Xk,1,Xk,2).
Player X can control its long-term payoff uX regardless of the action of player Y if and only if there
exist kmax, kmin ∈ {1, 2} where
Xkmax,max ≤ Xkmin,min. (6)
If so, any value of uX from the interval [Xkmax,max,Xkmin,min] can be achieved by using the following
mixed/probabilistic strategies:
p1,1 = 1 +
(
1−
X1,1
uX
)
b, (7)
p1,2 = 1 +
(
1−
X1,2
uX
)
b, (8)
p2,1 =
(
1−
X2,1
uX
)
b, (9)
p2,2 =
(
1−
X2,2
uX
)
b, (10)
where b is chosen such that, if kmin = 1 and kmax = 2, then
0 < b ≤ min
(
−1
1− X1,max
uX
,
1
1− X2,min
uX
)
,
and if kmin = 2 and kmax = 1, then
max
(
−1
1− X1,min
uX
,
1
1− X2,max
uX
)
≤ b < 0.
9Proof: We need to obtain a and b that satisfy m˜X = aX + b and render p1,1, p1,2, p2,1, and p2,2
as probabilities. First note that, by (5), a = − b
uX
and thus formulae (7–10) follow. Next, we obtain the
range of valid values of the non-zero variable b by dividing the search domain into two intervals; b > 0
and b < 0.
Case 1 (b > 0):
Consider (7) and (8) and notice that, for any value of b > 0 and a given value of uX , the condition
X1,min ≥ uX
is a sufficient and necessary condition for p1,1 and p1,2 to be less than or equal to 1. Similarly, for p2,1
and p2,2 to be greater than or equal to 0, we obtain the following condition from (9) and (10)
X2,max ≤ uX .
Therefore, uX cannot be fixed at values outside the interval [X2,max,X1,min]. To show that uX can be
fixed at any value in this interval, we need to show that there exist b > 0 such that p1,1 and p1,2 are
greater than or equal to 0 and such that p2,1 and p2,2 are less than or equal to 1. In this regard, from (7)
and (8) we obtain
0 < b ≤
−1
1− X1,1
uX
,
0 < b ≤
−1
1− X1,2
uX
.
Note that, since X1,1,X1,2 > uX , the tightest upper bound is −1
1−
X1,max
uX
. In the same way, from (9)
and (10) we obtain
0 < b ≤
1
1− X2,1
uX
,
0 < b ≤
1
1− X2,2
uX
,
and since X2,1,X2,2 < uX , 1
1−
X2,min
uX
is the tightest upper bound. Therefore, uX can be fixed at any
value in the interval [X2,max,X1,min] by choosing b from the following feasible range
0 < b ≤ min
(
−1
1− X1,max
uX
,
1
1− X2,min
uX
)
.
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Case 2 (b < 0):
We can follow the same steps in the previous case. Namely, for p1,1 and p1,2 to be less than or equal
to 1, it is required that
X1,max ≤ uX ,
and for p2,1 and p2,2 to be greater than or equal to 0, it is required that
X2,min ≥ uX .
Combining the previous conditions yields the new condition
X1,max ≤ X2,min,
Furthermore, for p1,1 and p1,2 to be greater than or equal to 0, we obtain the conditions
−1
1− X1,min
uX
≤ b < 0.
In a similar fashion, for p2,1 and p2,2 to be less than or equal to 1 we obtain
1
1− X2,max
uX
≤ b < 0.
Therefore, b can be chosen from the following feasible range
max
(
−1
1− X1,min
uX
,
1
1− X2,max
uX
)
≤ b < 0.
Theorem 1 provides a framework for understanding payoff control in 2×2 iterated games. It states that
the structure of the payoff matrix reveals the possibility of players controlling their long-term payoffs. In
fact, only if the maximum payoff in one row is less than or equal to the minimum in the other row, then
row player X can set the long-term payoff, uX , at any value between the minimum and the maximum,
inclusive. For example if X1,1 = 1,X1,2 = 0.75, and X2,1 = X2,2 = 0.5, then player X can set uX at
any value in the interval [0.5, 0.75].
The results in the theorem can be directly applied to player Y by considering the columns of the
payoff matrix of the player instead of the rows. In particular, let
Yk,min = min(Y1,k, Y2,k) and Yk,max = max(Y1,k, Y2,k),
then player Y can control its long-term payoff, uY , if and only if there exists kmax, kmin ∈ {1, 2}, where
kmax 6= kmin and Ykmax,max ≤ Ykmin,min.
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A simple example to verify strategies (7–10) in the theorem is to choose uX = Xkmin,min, meaning that
player X sets uX at the maximum value possible. If we assume that Xkmin,min = X1,1, then regardless
of the value of b, this always yields a strategy with p1,1 = 1, i.e., player X plays action 1 whenever
both players played this action in the previous round. One way to understand this result is to consider a
strategy of player Y playing action 1 in each round of the game. Player X will be then playing action 1
in each round as there will be no opportunity to make up for losses that may result in from not playing
that action in any of the previous rounds.
In the same example, assume that the ratio X1,1/X1,2 = 0.5 and assume that X2,1 = X2,2 = 0. If
b = 1, then this yields the deterministic strategy p1,1 = 1, p1,2 = 0, p2,1 = 1, and p2,2 = 1. This strategy
is quite intuitive since it tracks the payoff of player X such that, regardless of the strategy of player
Y , whenever the payoff in any round is X1,2, player X plays action 2 in the next round and gains 0
payoff, so that the average of the two rounds is maintained at the targeted value X1,1. In the next round,
the player plays action 1 to gain at least X1,1 and so on. The strategy is one of several strategies that
can be obtained by changing the value of the variable b, and which will be discussed in more details in
Section IV.
Two important observations can be carried from Theorem 1. First, the players can design their strategies
without an underlying assumption of knowledge of each other’s payoffs. All that a player needs to know
about the opponent at any round is the latter’s action in the previous round. This leads us to the second
observation which highlights a more general perspective of this theorem. In essence, if the structure of
the payoff matrix of the opponent admits the same structure described in the theorem, then a player can
control the long-term payoff of the opponent. For example, player X can control the payoff of player Y
if the payoff matrix of player Y satisfies conditions (6) with Xi,j replaced by Yi,j .
Controlling opponent’s payoff can be realized in games such as the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma where
Y1,2 > Y1,1 > Y2,2 > Y2,1. In this game, the row player can set the payoff of the column player at any
value in the interval [Y1,1, Y2,2]. Strategies for opponents controlling each other’s payoffs were previously
studied in [9] and presented for a subset of games where players have symmetric payoffs as in the case
of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
B. Iterated Games with Multiple Players
The results presented in the previous section can be extended to include games of more than two players.
Let N ≥ 2 denote the number of players in the game and assume they are indexed 1, 2, · · · , N . Let the
binary vector n(t) = (ni(t) : i = 1, · · · , N) describe the state of the game in a given round t, where
12
ni(t) ∈ {1, 2} for all i, t so that at any given t, n(t) ∈ {1, 2}N =: Ω. The process {n(t) : t = 0, 1, · · · }
can be described as a multi-dimensional Markov chain. In each round of the game, players take actions
with probabilities that depend on the state of the game in the previous round.
Let pki denote the probability that player i plays action 1 in a certain round if the game was in state
k in the previous round, and let
pi = (p
k
i : k ∈ Ω)
denote the complete strategy profile of player i. The state transition matrix of the N -player game can be
presented as a 2N × 2N matrix. Similar to the game with N = 2 players, we can apply Cramer’s rule to
M˜ = M− I and replace the last column (corresponding to all players taking action 2) with a “reward”
vector f. For l,k ∈ Ω, the entry in the kth row and lth column of M˜ is for all iterations t ≥ 0
Pr (n(t+ 1) = k | n(t) = l) =
∏
i∈Kk
pli
∏
j∈Lk
(1− plj)
where Kk is the set of players playing action 1 in state k and Lk is the set of players playing action 2
in state k.
Consider adding all columns Ci ⊂ Ω of M˜ which correspond to states where player i and at least one
other player plays action 1, to the column where only player i plays action 1. An entry of the resulting
column m˜i at row k is then given as
 −1 + p
k
i Γ if a diagonal element of M˜ is added to this entry,
pki Γ otherwise,
where
Γ =
∑
k∈Ci
∏
j∈Kk\i
pkj
∏
l∈Lk
(1− pkl ).
An important observation is that Γ = 1 since each product in Γ has elements that are either the
probability or its complement of a fixed set of events. Thus, the sum of all possible permutations of
these products evaluate to 1. Therefore, in a similar reasoning that led to (4), multiplying the stationary
distribution of the game pi with an arbitrary |Ω|-size vector f leads to the following structure (also
13
displaying m˜i)
pi
Tf = det


· · · −1 + pki · · · f1
· · · −1 + pki · · · f2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
· · · pki · · · f|Ω|−1
· · · pki · · · f|Ω|


.
So, a column that corresponds to the state where only player i plays action 1 has elements that depend
solely on the actions of that player.
We follow the developments that led to Theorem 1 and let Ui,n denote the payoff of player i if the
state of the game at the previous round was n. We also let Ui denote a vector of all possible outputs.
Let ui denote a generic value of the long-term payoff of player i. Thus, taking m˜i = f = aiUi + bi,
where ai and bi are non-zero real numbers leads to zero-determinant strategies for own payoff control,
which is formulated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In the game with N ≥ 2 players, for k=1,2, let
Ui,k,min = min(Ui,n : ni = k),
Ui,k,max = max(Ui,n : ni = k)),
where the first quantity is the minimum payoff of player i when playing action k, and the second quantity
is the maximum.
Player i can control its long-term payoff, ui, regardless of the actions of the other players in the game
if and only if there exists kmax, kmin ∈ {1, 2} where
Ui,kmax,max ≤ Ui,kmin,min.
If so, any value of ui from the interval [Ui,kmax,max,Xi,kmin,min] can be achieved by using the following
strategies:
pki =

 1 + (1−
Ui,k
ui
)bi, if player i plays action 1 in state k,
(1− Ui,k
ui
)bi, otherwise,
where bi is chosen such that,
if kmin = 1 and kmax = 2, then
0 < bi ≤ min
(
−1
1− Ui,1,max
ui
,
1
1− Ui,2,min
ui
)
,
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and if kmin = 2 and kmax = 1, then
max
(
−1
1− Ui,1,min
ui
,
1
1− Ui,2,max
ui
)
≤ bi < 0.
III. A NON-COOPERATIVE GAME FOR SHARING LICENSED SPECTRUM
In this section, we apply our results to design strategies for sharing licensed spectrum bands. We
consider a general model for spectrum sharing that involves N service providers indexed i = 1, 2, · · · , N
sharing a channel of bandwidth W . We assume that the channel is primarily licensed to a single entity
that we refer to as the license holder. We consider a cold leasing model where the license holder may
not deploy any network or equipment, and thus, offering the channel to the service providers without
access coordination. This model is one of several models that have been suggested for treating spectrum
bands as private commons where the ultimate ownership of spectrum is preserved by the license holder
(See for example [8]).
We model the underlying communication system as an interference channel where at times when the
channel is less congested, the service providers create less interfere to each other, and thus can achieve
better throughput rates. We focus on the downlink and assume that the service providers have fixed pools
of end-users co-located within a certain geographical area. See Figure 2 for a description of this model.
Let Si denote the set of end-users of service provider i. The license holder regulates channel access
by imposing a limit on the maximum transmission power of each service provider. It also allocates the
underlying code space for transmission to individual end-users. Power and code allocations are normally
negotiated with the license holder and provided through “secondary provider” contracts.
We follow a simple model of common-channel interference under CDMA where transmission of a
service provider to a given end-user appears as noise to all other end-users, including those belonging to
other service providers. While interference cancellation techniques can be still applied, they are precluded
in this model due to practical limitations such as decoder complexities and delay constraints. Similar
assumptions have been widely used in the literature of interference channels, see for example [12].
The service providers use power control to maintain certain throughput via controlling their transmission
power levels on the downlinks. In interference channels, an increase in the transmission power on one of
the downlinks causes interference on the other links and thus a degradation in the Signal to Interference
and Noise Ratio (SINR) at the receiving sides of those links. In this regard, let Λi,max denote the
maximum transmission power allocated to service provider i. A power control scheme of a service
provider specifies the transmission power allocated to each end-user on the downlink. Let the vector
15
service provider i service provider j
hi,1
hj,1 hi,2
hj,2
end-user 1 end-user 2
Fig. 2. A channel access model where a number of service providers share a channel and provide downlink services to groups
of end-users spatially located in over-lapping coverage areas. Each end-user receives service for its designated service provider,
but also gets interference from other service providers.
λi = (λi,1, λi,2, · · · λi,|Si|) denote the power control scheme of service provider i. If all service providers
transmit at their maximum power levels, the SINR of end-user k ∈ Si can be represented by
γi,k(λi) =
λi,khi,k
σk + hi,k(Λi,max − λi,k) +
∑
j 6=i hj,kΛj,max
,
where hi,k is the path gain between the base station of service provider i and end-user k,3 and σk is the
noise power at end-user k [20]. The achievable throughput rate at the downlink of user k ∈ Si can be
obtained using Shannon’s formula
ri,k(λi) = W log2(1 + γi,k(λi)), (11)
and the aggregate rate on the downlink of service provider i is thus given by
Ri(λi) =
∑
k∈Si
ri,k(λi). (12)
It is plausible to measure the utilities of service providers from sharing the channel by the quality
of service they provide on the downlinks. One important measure in this regard is the average delay of
3In fact, it is path attenuation since hi,k < 1. In practice, path attenuations may be obtained by use of pilot signals or may
not be explicitly discovered if the power control mechanism is performed by adaptive dithering.
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packet delivery, which can be reduced by improving the rate on the downlink. Let R¯i be the long-term
average downlink rate of service provider i. We denote the utility of the service provider by the function
Ui(.) which is strictly increasing in R¯i.
A distinctive feature of secondary utilization of licensed spectrum bands is that the utility of secondary
users, i.e., service providers, is discounted by some cost paid in the form of a fee to the license holder.
See for example [1], [21], [22] for studies that involve economic models and pricing techniques for
secondary spectrum utilization. Here, we consider a pricing scheme where the license holder charges
the service providers on usage basis per unit data transmitted on the downlinks. Let ci denote the price
charged to service provider i per unit data transmitted on the channel. Thus, the optimal aggregate rate
R¯∗i of the service provider is a solution of the optimization problem
max
R¯i
Ui(R¯i)− ciR¯i,
which has a unique solution if Ui is concave.
From the standpoint of service provider i, achieving R¯∗i requires the service provider to transmit at a
certain power level taking into consideration the interference created by other service providers. In the
light of lack of central coordination, some service providers may unpredictably change their transmission
power levels to adapt their rates according to their demand, thus causing variations in the interference
to the other service providers. Sharing an interference channel with users that transmit at varying power
levels can be modeled as a non-cooperative iterated game, where it can be assumed that the channel is
offered to the service providers in rounds. In each round, the service providers choose their transmission
power levels, which can vary from round to round according to their anticipated demand levels. Similar
models for sharing interference channels have been considered, for example, in [12].
We refer to this game as the iterated power control game. In each round of the game, the service
providers adapt their power levels based on some history of the game to maintain R¯∗i regardless of the
power control strategy of the opponents. The theory of zero-determinant strategies presented in Section II
helps provide guidelines for power control in such environments that involve uncoordinated spectrum
access. In the sequel, we present the iterated power control game for the case of two service providers,
where the service providers fix their power allocation schemes λi, but take binary decisions in each round
on whether or not to engage their users. We identify the range of values of R¯∗i that can be achieved and
characterize strategies for achieving these values.
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P
P
P
P
P
P
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provider 1
provider 2
Access No Access
Access (θ1R1, θ2R2) (R1, 0)
No Access (0, R2) (0, 0)
Fig. 3. Payoff matrix of the power control game. Service providers 1 and 2 achieve rates R1 and R2, respectively, if they
access the channel solely. If both providers access the channel simultaneously, then provider i achieves θiRi.
A. Iterated Power Control Game with Two Service Providers and Binary Action Space
Consider an iterated power control game with two service providers labeled 1 and 2. The payoff matrix
of the single shot game is shown in Figure 3. For ease of exposition, we will assume that in each round
of the game the service providers choose either to transmit at a certain power level or at zero power.
That is, the service providers can choose between two actions: either to access or not to access the
channel. We assume that if one service provider accesses the channel, it achieves downlink rate R1 if it
is service provider 1 and rate R2 if it is service provider 2. Both R1 and R2 are described by (12). If
both service providers access the channel, then potentially both achieve lower rates θiRi, i = 1, 2 with
0 < θi < 1. Trivially, the service provider that does not access the channel in any given round achieves
no rate.4 However, the game can be extended to include power values that are not necessarily limited
to 0 and Λi,max. Furthermore, extensions to more than two service providers follow directly from the
generalization in Proposition 1.
The payoff matrix of this game has a structure identified by Theorem 1. It allows any of the service
providers to exert control on its rate. Specifically, let 1 denote access and 2 denote no access. In any
round, from the perspective of service provider i, the game can be in one of four possible states given
by the set
Ωi = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)},
where the first element of a tuple refers to an action by service provider i and the second element refers
to an action by the other service provider. Let ni(t) ∈ {1, 2} denote an action by service provider i at
4Here, we assume a stationary model of user path gains. Namely, mobility of users may result in time-varying path gains
as when a user enters a deep fade region or when handed off to a neighboring base-station of the same provider or to another
provider in the same region. To handle such transients, the power control iterations need to be performed on a faster time-scale.
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round t of the game. Also let n(t) = (n1, n2) and let
pki = Pr (ni(t+ 1) = 1|n(t) = k) , ∀k ∈ Ωi.
Therefore, following the results in Theorem 1, service provider i can fix its long-term rate, R¯i, at any
value in the interval (0, θiRi] by accessing the channel in each round of the game according to the
following policy
p1,1i = 1 + (1− θiRi/R¯i)bi, (13)
p1,2i = 1 + (1−Ri/R¯i)bi, (14)
p2,1i = bi, (15)
p2,2i = bi, (16)
where bi is chosen such that
0 < bi ≤
1
|1−Ri/R¯i|
.
Obtaining values of R1, R2, θ1, θ2, which identify the range of possible fixations of the outcome of
the game and the associated access strategies, hinges on the underlying power allocation scheme, λi,
applied by the service providers on the downlinks. In the following, we derive lumped parameters for
computing these values for the max-min power allocation scheme that maximizes the minimum rate on
the downlinks. Specifically, for service provider i, the max-min scheme requires solving the following
optimization problem
max
λi
min
k∈Si
γi,k(λi)
subject to
∑
k∈Si
λi,k = Λi,max,
where it is implied that the service providers transmit at the maximum allowed power Λi,max. A solution
of this problem results in equal rates ri on all the downlinks of service provider i.
To compute Ri, consider the case where only service provider i accesses the channel. In this case, the
rate achieved at any of the downlinks k ∈ Si is given by
ri = W log2
(
1 +
λi,khi,k
σk + hi,k(Λi,max − λi,k)
)
,
and thus Ri = |Si|ri. Equal rates can be maintained on all the downlinks by choosing λi,k and λi,l for
all k, l ∈ Si such that
hi,kλi,k
σk + hi,k(Λi,max − λi,k)
=
hi,lλi,l
σl + hi,l(Λi,max − λi,l)
,
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which can be equivalently written as
hi,kλi,k
σk + hi,kΛi,max
=
hi,lλi,l
σl + hi,lΛi,max
=: K, ∀k, l ∈ Si.
Thus,
λi,k = K
(
σk
hi,k
+ Λi,max
)
, ∀k ∈ Si.
Note that Λi,max =
∑
k∈Si
λi,k and therefore, for maximum Ri,
K =
Λi,max∑
k∈Si
σk
hi,k
+ |Si|Λi,max
.
θi can be computed in a similar fashion by considering both service providers i and j simultaneously
transmitting on the channel and taking into consideration the interference they create to each other. In
this case, let r˜i denote the rate on each downlink of service provider i. Thus, θiRi = |Si|r˜i where for
all k ∈ Si,
r˜i = W log2
(
1 +
λi,khi,k
σk + hi,k(Λi,max − λi,k) + hj,kΛj,max
)
.
The power distribution on the downlinks can be obtained by equalizing all the rates. Thus,
λi,k = K˜
(
σk
hi,k
+ Λi,max + Λj,max
hj,k
hi,k
)
, ∀k ∈ Si,
where
K˜ =
Λi,max∑
k∈Si
σk+Λj,maxhj,k
hi,k
+ |Si|Λi,max
.
IV. NUMERICAL STUDY
In this section, we provide insight into the zero-determinant strategies for the 2 × 2 game described
in Figure 3. The structure of these strategies is given by formulae (13)-(16). Without loss of generality,
we consider a symmetric game with R1 = R2 = 1.0 and θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. Here, each service provider can
fix R¯i to values in the range (0, 0.5]. From the standpoint of service provider 1, i.e., the row player, the
zero-determinant strategies (p1,1, p1,2, p2,1, p2,2) for a given R¯1 have the following structure(
1 + (1−
0.5
R¯1
)b1, 1 + (1−
1
R¯1
)b1, b1, b1
)
, (17)
where
0 < b1 ≤
1
|1− 1/R¯i|
.
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R*1 = 0.5, strategy (1, 0, 1, 1)
R*1 = 0.25, strategy (2/3, 0, 1/3, 1/3)
R*1 = 0.1, strategy (5/9, 0, 1/9, 1/9)
Fig. 4. Rate convergence under zero-determinants strategies in a 2 × 2 channel sharing game with R1 = R2 = 1.0 and
θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. Service provider 2 (column player) uses a random strategy with probability of access = 1/2 in each round.
A. Convergence of the Zero-Determinant Strategies
First, consider the deterministic strategy (1, 0, 1, 1) which corresponds to b1 = 1 and which allows the
service provider to achieve a long-term average rate R¯1 = 0.5. Assume the strategy is played against
service provider 2 which accesses the channel in each round with probability equal to 1/2. Figure 4
shows the average rate of service provider 1 at different rounds of the game as it converges, in the
long term, to the value 0.5. Convergence paths are also provided for the strategies (2/3, 0, 1/3, 1/3) and
(5/9, 0, 1/9, 1/9) which lead, respectively, to R¯1 = 0.25 and R¯1 = 0.1.
A common factor of these strategies is that p1,2 = 0, which means that if the service provider ends up
using the channel alone in any round, it will not access the channel in the next round. Strategies with this
property can be obtained by setting b1 at the highest possible value. These rectifying strategies guarantee
that there will be no long time periods of deviation from R¯1 which explains why all the previous strategies
converge relatively quickly to R¯1.
Figure 5 shows convergence paths of different strategies that achieve R¯1 = 0.5 including the strategy
(1,0,1,1). All the strategies are played against the same service provider that has a probability of channel
access equal to 1/2. Note that as p1,2 increases, strategies take longer time to converge. This is due to
the fact that if the service provider accesses the channel in one round, then as p1,2 increases, it is more
likely that the service provider will access the channel in the next round, and thus, it is more likely to
deviate more from R¯1. In the meantime, an increase in p1,2 is accompanied with a decrease in p2,1 and
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Strategy (1, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2)
Strategy (1, 2/3, 1/3, 1/3)
Strategy (1, 9/10, 1/10, 1/10)
Fig. 5. Convergence paths of different zero-determinant strategies that can be applied by service provider 1 (row player) in
the power control game. Strategies with higher p1,2 are slower to converge, since as p1,2 increases, it becomes more likely for
the service provider to access the channel in the next round if already accessed the channel in the previous round. This leads
to longer periods of deviation from R¯i, and thus, longer conversion times.
p2,2 by formula (17). This leads to long periods of channel access that are followed by long periods of
no channel access and thus, the strategy tends to converge relatively slowly.
A less obvious conclusion can be carried from games of more than two service providers. For example,
consider the game with three service providers i, j, k. Assume that in any round of the game, service
provider i achieves one of the following rates:

Ri, if accesses the channel alone,
α1Ri, if accesses the channel with another provider,
α2Ri, if all the service providers access the channel,
0, otherwise,
where 0 < α1, α2 < 1. Let xi, xj , xk denote, respectively, the actions of player i, j, k in any round,
where xi, xj , xk ∈ {1, 2} and such that 1 implies access and 2 implies no access. Let pxi,xj ,xki denote
the probability that service provider i accesses the channel if the state of the game was (xi, xj , xk) in
the previous round.
Following Proposition 1, a zero-determinant strategy allows service provider i to fix R¯i at any value
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Fig. 6. Convergence paths for multiple zero-determinant strategies in the power control game with three service providers.
Strategies that are more likely to rectify, if exceeding the targeted rate, are the strategies that converge relatively quicker.
in the interval (0, α2Ri]. The structure of the policy is given by:
p1,1,1i = 1 + (1−
α2Ri
R¯i
)bi,
p1,1,2i = p
1,2,1
i = 1 + (1−
α1Ri
R¯i
)bi,
p1,2,2i = 1 + (1−
Ri
R¯i
)bi,
p2,1,1i = p
2,1,2
i = p
2,2,1
i = p
2,2,2
i = bi,
where
0 < bi ≤
1
|1−Ri/R¯i|
.
Figure 6 shows convergence paths of different strategies when Ri = 1.0, α1 = 1/2, and α2 = 1/3.
All the strategies aim to fix R¯i at the maximum possible value, 1/3, where service providers j and k
access the channel at each round with probability 1/2 and 3/4, respectively. A strategy is displayed in
the figure by an 8-element tuple where the first 4 elements correspond to p1,1,1i , p
1,1,2
i , p
1,2,1
i , and p
1,2,2
i ,
respectively. Note that, since R¯i is fixed at the maximum value, then p1,1,11 = 1 for all the strategies. The
pattern observed in Figure 5 applies to Figure 6 where strategies that converge quickly are the strategies
that have lower p1,1,2i , p
1,2,1
i , and p
1,2,2
i , i.e., these are the strategies that are less likely to access the
channel if they achieved more than the targeted rate, 1/3, in the previous round.
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B. Zero-Determinant Strategies and Power Consumption
Next, we investigate the impact of the zero-determinant strategies on the average power consumption of
the service providers. In the considered power control game, the service providers take binary decisions
in each round whether or not to access the channel. If the channel is to be accessed, service provider i
transmits at the maximum allowed power level Λi,max. Therefore, power consumption over the course of
the game has a probability distribution derived from the stationary distribution of the state of the game,
pi. In particular, consider a 2×2 power control game and consider service provider 1, i.e., the row player.
The average consumed power is given by
Λ1,avg = Λ1,max(pi1,1 + pi1,2).
Here, pi1,1 is the proportion of rounds where both service providers transmit and pi1,2 is the proportion
where only service provider 1 transmits.
Consider the game in Figure 3 and assume that R1 = R2 = 1.0 and θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. Assume that
both service providers use zero-determinant strategies to achieve R¯1 = 0.5 and R¯2 = 0.25. The impact
of the different strategies on power savings is shown in Figure 7. The horizontal axis displays possible
strategies of service provider 1 with each strategy denoted by a different value of the variable b1 defined
in (17). All the values of b1 are taken from the feasible range [0.1, 1], and a common factor of all these
strategies is that p1,1 = 1. We show the proportion of rounds in which service provider 1 accesses the
channel, (pi1,1 + pi1,2), where each curve corresponds to a different strategy of service provider 2. Here,
the strategies of service provider 2 are denoted by the vector q = (q1,1, q2,1, q1,2, q2,2), where, following
the convention in Section II, qx,y is the probability that service provider 2 will access the channel if
service provider 1 played action x and service provider 2 played action y in the previous round.
The figure shows that power consumption of service provider 1 is unimodal in the value of b1, but
can be increasing or decreasing according to the strategy of the opponent. The figure also shows that
there exists a trend in power savings that the service provider can achieve from playing against different
opponent strategies. Namely, playing against strategies that have relatively low q1,1 leads to more power
savings. The intuition behind this observation is that when q1,1 is low, service provider 2 is more likely
to skip the channel in the next round if both service providers accessed the channel in the current round.
Now since p1,1 = 1, service provider 1 will have the whole channel with probability 1 in the next round,
i.e., transmitting with no interference and thus achieving high rate.
This argument can be solidified by looking at p1,2 vs q1,2 and p2,1 vs q2,1. Notice that by increasing b1,
p1,2 decreases and p2,1 increases, and thus, if playing against a strategy with relatively high q1,2 (meaning
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Fig. 7. Proportion of rounds in which service provider 1 (row player) accesses the channel displayed for different strategies of
service provider 2. Playing against strategies that are more likely to skip the channel when the other service provider accesses
the channel leads to power savings.
low q2,1) such as q = (2/3, 0, 1/3, 1/3), the gap between the previous values is going to increase. This
means that, if in any round only one service providers accessed the channel, it is more likely for the
other service provider to access the channel in the next round, and visa versa, leading to more power
savings. On the other hand, the gap decreases if compared to a strategy with relatively low q1,2 and high
q2,1 such as q = (9/10, 7/10, 1/10, 1/10). In such a case, power consumption is going to increase.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered private commons as a model for secondary sharing of licensed spectrum
bands. The system involves multiple wireless service providers sharing an interference channel in unco-
ordinated fashion and servicing their own populations of co-located end-users. The problem of aggregate
downlink power control is formulated as a non-cooperative iterated game. In this regard, we considered
a set of Markovian strategies known as “zero-determinant” strategies that are primarily developed for
the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma game and which are shown to allow players to exert control on each
other’s score. We extended these strategies to be considered for any 2× 2 game and in a way based on
the structure of the game. We showed that the spectrum sharing game admits an appealing structure that
allows service providers to employ power control strategies to set their own aggregate rates regardless of
the strategies of other service providers. We provided numerical experiments to study the convergence
behavior of these strategies and their impact on power consumption.
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